This paper examines the effects of disclosure and other corporate governance mechanisms on the cost of equity capital in Asia's emerging markets with newly released surveys from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA). We find that both disclosure and non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms have a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity capital. In addition, the effect of non-disclosure governance mechanisms is more profound than that of disclosure on the cost of equity capital. Specifically, after controlling for beta and size, when a firm improves its aggregate non-disclosure corporate governance ranking from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, its cost of equity capital is reduced roughly by 1.26 percentage points, while the corresponding reduction in the cost of equity capital for the same improvement in disclosure is 0.47. Finally, we find that country-level investor protection and firm-level corporate governance are both important in reducing the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that, in emerging markets where infrastructural factors, such as the legal protection of investors and the overall level of corporate governance, are not well established, reducing the expropriation risk by strengthening overall corporate governance appears to be more important in reducing the cost of equity capital than adopting a more forthright disclosure policy.
Introduction
Whether or not disclosure reduces a firm's cost of capital is the focus of a growing body of accounting research. The study of this issue is motivated by the economic theory that greater disclosure lowers the information asymmetry (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Diamond and Verricchia 1991) and the estimation risk (e.g., Barry and Brown 1985) . Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that firms disclosing more have more accurate and less dispersed analyst earnings forecasts. Welker (1995) and Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) further document that firms with greater disclosure have lower bid-ask spreads, a measure of the cost related to information asymmetry. Botosan (1997) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) provide a direct link by showing a negative relation between the disclosure in annual reports and the cost of equity capital for firms followed by few analysts and for firms in general, respectively. Further, Sengupta (1998) reports that firms disclosing more pay lower costs in issuing debt. Citing this body of evidence to support the importance of disclosure, Standard & Poor's in 2001 launched an ambitious survey of transparency and disclosure covering 1,600 companies around the world.
However, there are at least two dimensions that are not yet explored in this body of research. The first issue is whether the results mentioned above can be generalized to emerging markets. More specifically, does disclosure have the same effect in reducing the cost of equity capital in both developed and emerging markets? The answer to this question is not so obvious.
On the one hand, if securities with low information quality are a nontrivial part of the final portfolios chosen by investors, the estimation risk will be non-diversifiable (Clarkson et al. 1996) .
Compared with developed markets, the quality of accounting income in emerging markets is lower (e.g., Ball et al. 2003) , which suggests that securities with high information risk may account for a greater proportion of the portfolios held by investors in emerging markets than in developed markets. This makes the estimation risk in emerging markets even more difficult to diversify. Thus, the marginal benefit of disclosure in reducing the cost of equity capital might be greater in emerging markets. On the other hand, the weak legal protection of property rights in emerging markets discourages informed arbitragers to capitalize on firm-specific information (Morck et al. 2000) . Thus, investors might pay less attention to disclosure that sheds light on firm-specific future prospects, making disclosure less effective in reducing the cost of equity capital in emerging markets.
The second issue that has not yet been explored is, besides disclosure, whether other corporate governance mechanisms can also reduce the cost of capital by reducing the risk of expropriation by majority shareholders. This issue is important for two reasons. One is that disclosure is typically considered as an integral part of corporate governance in research (e.g., Mitton 2002, Durnev and and in surveys (e.g., CLSA 2001 and 2002; Standard & Poor's 2002) . The relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital might change after controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. The other reason is that there is a growing literature showing that investor protection or corporate governance enhances firm value (e.g., Black et al. 2003; Claessens et al. 2002; Gompers et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 2002) .
However, these studies typically assume that investor protection or corporate governance affects firm valuation by reducing expropriation by majority shareholders and improving the expected cash flows that can be distributed to shareholders. Whether or not those mechanisms also affect the cost of equity capital, another determinant of firm value, is unknown. 1 This is an important issue, because the cost of capital is a more direct measure of a firm's financing costs than firm valuation and financing costs affect not only a firm's investment decisions, but also its external financing capability.
This study adds insights along these two dimensions. Using two newly released surveys from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), we find a negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital in Asia's emerging markets. Thus, the same relationship that exists in the U.S. can be extended to emerging markets. We also find a negative relationship between the non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms and the cost of equity capital. This suggests that corporate governance enhances firm value by reducing the cost of equity capital, not just by improving the expected cash flows that can be distributed to shareholders. Moreover, we find that the effect of the non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms on the cost of equity capital is stronger than that of disclosure. More specifically, after controlling for beta and size, when a firm improves its aggregate non-disclosure corporate governance ranking from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, its cost of equity capital is reduced roughly by 1.26 percentage points, while the corresponding reduction in the cost of equity capital for the same improvement in disclosure is only 0.47 point . Finally, we show that country-level investor protection and firm-level corporate governance are both important in reducing the cost of equity capital, when both variables are included in a regression.
The findings in this study bolster the argument for stronger corporate governance around the world, and especially in Asia. Three surveys conducted by McKinsey & Co. in 1999 (Coombes and Watson 2000 show that institutional investors from around the world are willing to pay a premium of more than 20% for shares in companies with good corporate governance. In addition, the surveyed premium levels in Asia's emerging markets are higher than those in more mature markets, such as the U.S. and the U.K., which reflects the relatively poorer corporate governance of companies in Asia. The results reported in this study corroborate the findings of the McKinsey survey. That is, investors not only have the willingness, but are also, in fact, already paying a premium for good corporate governance.
Based on our estimation, the 1.26-point reduction in the cost of capital via the improvement in corporate governance can translate into an increase of more than 20% in firm value with some reasonable assumptions. In other words, our empirical evidence is consistent with the McKinsey survey that investors are willing to pay a premium of more than 20% for good corporate governance.
Moreover, the finding that the non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms are more important than disclosure in reducing the cost of equity capital implies that the value of disclosure for investors appears to be dependent on the legal protection of investors and the overall level of corporate governance in the economy. In other words, as those factors are lacking in Asia, although corporate disclosure is significant, it seems that strengthening the overall level of corporate governance should be of higher priority at present to reduce a firm's cost of capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample construction process and the measures of disclosure and corporate governance provided by CLSA. Section 4 describes the method used to estimate the cost of equity capital and tests the validity of our estimates. Section 5 provides empirical evidence of the relationships among the cost of equity capital, disclosure, and other corporate governance. Section 6 conducts sensitivity tests. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Hypotheses

Disclosure and the cost of equity capital in emerging markets
The literature on the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) typically invokes two streams of analytical research to postulate a negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital. The first is that disclosure lowers the cost of equity capital by reducing the information asymmetry and, in turn, enhancing the stock market liquidity (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Welker 1995; Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999) . 2 The second is that disclosure can reduce the estimation risk, which is not diversifiable under certain conditions. For example, Clarkson et al. (1996) show that, if investors' portfolios consist of many securities with low information quality, the estimation risk is non-diversifiable. 3 In comparison to the market in the U.S., emerging markets are known to have more severe information asymmetry problems. For example, Domowitz et al. (2000) find that emerging markets have significantly higher trading costs, which are related to asymmetric information, even after controlling for factors affecting trading costs such as market capitalization and volatility. Therefore, disclosure might have a stronger effect in reducing information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital in emerging markets. In addition, the quality of accounting information in Asia's emerging markets is also lower (Ball et al. 2003) , suggesting that securities with high information risk may account for a higher proportion of portfolios held by investors. This makes the estimation risk in Asia's emerging markets even more difficult to diversify and increases the marginal benefit of disclosure in reducing the cost of equity capital.
The recognition hypothesis developed by Merton (1987) , to be discussed in detail below, also supports a negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital.
According to this hypothesis, if more disclosure can attract more investors to hold the stock in their portfolios, the importance of idiosyncratic risk can be reduced and, in turn, the cost of capital can be lower.
Moreover, the corporate governance literature developed in recent years also points out an additional way through which disclosure could reduce the cost of equity capital. Disclosure is commonly regarded as one of the dimensions of corporate governance in academic research (e.g., Mitton 2002; Durnev and Kim 2003) and in corporate governance surveys, including those by CLSA and Standard & Poor's. The reason is that disclosure facilitates the external monitoring of corporate insiders and reduces the risk of being expropriated by corporate insiders.
As discussed below, corporate governance could reduce the cost of equity capital, and so could disclosure.
Despite the various arguments supporting a negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital, there are at least two forces pulling the relationship in the opposite direction. For one thing, firms in emerging markets are characterized by highly concentrated ownership and lack of legal enforcement (La Porta et al. 1998a , 1999 . Because large shareholders control the information production process and they are not constrained by strong legal enforcement, financial reporting in emerging markets is more prone to manipulation (Leuz et al. 2003) . Accordingly, investors pay less attention to the information disclosed (Fan and Wong 2002) . For another, the weak legal protection of property rights in Asia's emerging markets discourages informed investors from capitalizing on firm-specific information, resulting in high synchronous stock prices movement (Morck et al. 2000) . This also implies that investors might pay less attention to disclosure that sheds light on firm-specific future prospects, making disclosure less effective in reducing the cost of equity capital in emerging markets than in developed markets.
The combination of the factors discussed above could make the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital in emerging markets either more or less significant than that observed in the U.S. Thus, whether disclosure is useful in reducing the cost of equity capital in Asia's emerging markets becomes an empirical issue, which can be tested by using the following alternative hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1:
Greater disclosure lowers the cost of equity capital.
Corporate governance and the cost of equity capital
La Porta et al. (2000) define corporate governance as a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by insiders. The agency theory suggests that corporate insiders tend to expropriate outside investors. We argue that the degree of expropriation by corporate insiders is asymmetric and depends, among other issues, on the investment opportunity and the cost of expropriation. The degree of expropriation by corporate insiders is negatively correlated with their investment opportunities, because better investment opportunities imply higher opportunity costs of the expropriated corporate resources (e.g., Johnson et al. 2000; Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002; and Durnev and Kim 2003) . A firm's specific investment opportunity has a non-diversifiable component that depends on macroeconomic conditions. As a result, the expropriation by insiders also has a component that is related to the market condition and is not diversifiable. In other words, insiders are expected to expropriate more when the market is bad and less when market is good. This negative correlation between expropriation and the market condition exaggerates the firm's systematic risk and must be compensated for by a higher expected return.
By shaping the cost function of expropriation, corporate governance affects the correlation between the degree of expropriation and the market conditions. In particular, good corporate governance will constrain the degree of expropriation in bad times. Research on the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis provides plenty of evidence. For example, Johnson et al. (2000) find that weak legal institutions for corporate governance can exacerbate the stock market decline in the 1997 financial crisis. Mitton (2002) finds that companies with better firm-level governance had better market performance during the Asian financial crisis, and Lemmon and Lins (2001) find that the measure of the likelihood of being expropriated is positively correlated with the decline of Tobin's Q ratios and stock prices during the crisis.
From the above discussion, it is clear that corporate governance will affect the cost of equity capital. We can formally model this argument as follows. We assume that there are two periods, time t and time t+1. For simplicity, suppose that all firms can generate an identical random cash flow of C at time t+1. We assume that the expected value of C is positive.
We also assume that investors receive only a portion of the cash flow generated by the firm ( C g i~) , depending on the strength of the firm's corporate governance, denoted by g i, with 0 ≤ g i ≤ can be modeled as
where ũ has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σ u and
. ũ can be interpreted as the common factor of additional expropriation. u g u i i) 1 ( or − can be thought of as additional expropriation (or subsidization) by insiders, which is negatively related to corporate governance and is dependent on the condition of the market. Equation (1) captures the idea that the better the corporate governance, the greater is the expected cash flow generated by the firm available to investors. In addition, the insiders will expropriate more cash flow during a bad market and less during a good market. That is, the expropriation is asymmetric.
For simplicity, we assume that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) holds. 4 Under the above setting, the value of firm i at time t (V i ) can be expressed as:
where R i is the risk-adjusted discount rate for firm i, R f is the risk-free rate, m R is the return on the market portfolio, E(.) is the expectation operator, and Cov(.,.) is the covariance operator.
It is easy to show that if the zero-mean component of expropriation, ũ , is uncorrelated with the market, corporate governance can only affect the expected cash flow, and not the cost of equity capital:
where V is the value of the firm with the best corporate governance, i.e., g=1, and R is its risk-adjusted cost of capital. However, when the zero-mean component of expropriation, ũ , is negatively correlated with the market, corporate governance can affect both the expected cash flow and the cost of capital. Using equation (2), we can show that greater corporate governance suggests a lower cost of capital.
[ ]
The prediction of this model is closely related to the recognition hypothesis suggested by Merton (1987) and a model derived by Himmelberg et al. (2002) . Merton (1987) derives an asset-pricing model with incomplete information, which does not require the validity of CAPM.
In equilibrium, if investors include only stocks that they recognize in their portfolios, the required rates of return (or the cost of equity capital) are positively related to both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. In addition, less recognition by investors increases the importance of idiosyncratic risk. If better corporate governance attracts more investors to include the stock in their portfolios, then Merton's recognition hypothesis also suggests a negative relation between corporate governance and the cost of equity capital. Himmelberg et al. (2002) examine the cost of capital in a model with an agency conflict between inside mangers and outside shareholders.
Inside ownership reflects the tradeoff between risk diversification and incentives, and the severity of the agency costs depends on investor protection. Under this setting, they find that the marginal cost of capital is a weighted average of terms representing both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk and that weaker investor protection is associated with a higher weight on idiosyncratic risk. This prediction is consistent with Merton's recognition hypothesis.
From the above discussion, our second hypothesis is stated as follows.
Hypothesis 2: Better corporate governance lowers the cost of equity capital.
Investors rely on both the country-level and firm-level corporate governance to alleviate corporate insiders' expropriation. Thus, the corporate governance variable in the above hypothesis can be measured at both firm-and country-levels. The scores from CLSA's corporate governance surveys, to be discussed below, are used as the firm-level measures, while the variables representing the legal protection of investors in each market (to be detailed in Section 5.3) will be used as the country-level measure of corporate governance quality. Table 1 .
Sample Selection and Measurements of
[Insert Table 1 here]
The measures of disclosure and corporate governance
In response to the growing demand by investors for independent assessment of corporate governance, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) Emerging Markets, a provider of brokerage 5 Some studies also use disclosure scores from Standard & Poor's transparency and disclosure survey. The Standard & Poor's survey intends to measure the disclosure of corporate governance instead of its strength (Standard & Poor's 2002) . Since the focus of this study is the different effects of disclosure and non-disclosure corporate governance on the cost of equity capital, the data from S&P's survey are not used here. 6 The nine economies in our study are Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. holy…but not yet!" In these reports, firms' corporate governance was assessed based on seven key criteria. 8 The reports also show that good corporate governance is associated with strong performance in several dimensions, including share price levels, stock returns, and accounting profitability.
The appendix reproduces the rating criteria used in CLSA's two surveys, which are summarized into seven major categories: (1) transparency (TRAN), (2) management discipline (DSPL), (3) independence (INDP), (4) accountability (ACCT), (5) responsibility (RESP), (6) fairness (FAIR), and (7) social awareness (SOCL). The meanings of these categories are as follows. "Transparency" refers to the ability of outsiders to assess the true position of a company. "Discipline" refers to management's commitment to emphasize shareholder value and financial discipline. "Independence" refers to the board of director's independence of controlling shareholders and senior management. "Accountability" refers to the accountability of management to the board of directors. "Responsibility" refers to the effectiveness of the board to take necessary measures in case of mismanagement. "Fairness" refers to the treatment minority shareholders receive from majority shareholders and management. The last category, "social awareness," refers to the company's emphasis on ethical and socially responsible behavior.
Each category includes from six to ten criteria, with a total of 57 criteria. Each of them 7 Earlier in October 2000, CLSA issued a much smaller-scaled corporate governance report entitled "The Tide is Out: Who's Swimming Naked?" Because this report covers only 115 firms and uses a much less rigorous set of criteria, it is not used in this study. 8 The firms selected are larger ones or ones that receive higher investor interest in each market.
is stated in the form of a questionnaire; CLSA asks its analysts covering a company to give a zero/one answer to each question. The answers to the questions in each category are summed to form a score and then scaled by the total number of questions in the corresponding category to convert it into a percentage.
Because the focus of this study is the different effects of disclosure and other corporate governance mechanisms on the cost of equity capital, the seven categories are separated into three groups, disclosure (including transparency only), non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms, including categories 2 through 6, and social awareness. The five measures of non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms are summarized into a composite measure denoted as NDCG. We do not include social awareness as a variable, because this dimension is not expected to affect the cost of equity capital. 9 Some items in the CLSA survey depend on the results of subjective assessments based on the analyst's experience in covering the company. This approach has the advantage of measuring the essence, instead of the form of disclosure and governance, but is also susceptible to analyst's bias (Brooker 2001) . To alleviate the potential bias, CLSA designed 70% of the questions to be based on facts, such as whether the board meets at least four times a year. In addition, when a subjective assessment has to be made, analysts have to provide a definite yes/no answer to reduce the degree of subjectivity. The validity of the CLSA scores has been corroborated by other studies. For example, Khanna et al. (2002) construct a "scandal index,"
based on the media-reported incidences of expropriation, tax evasion, and price fixing, for a group of Indian firms covered by CLSA. They find that companies with low CLSA scores are more likely to have scandals. Similar support is reported by Durnev and Kim (2003) , who extend the analysis to 84 firms in 14 countries.
Panel A of [Insert Table 2 here] 
Estimation of the Cost of Equity Capital in Asia 4.1 Estimation approach
Two approaches have been used in the literature to estimate the cost of equity capital.
The first is to use average realized returns as a proxy for expected return. However, this approach has been proven to be very imprecise (Fama and French, 1997) , due to the difficulties of the choice of an asset-pricing model and the imprecise estimates of risk loadings and factor risk premiums. Elton (1999) also points out that realized returns are a poor proxy for expected returns.
In this study we adopt the second approach, which estimates the ex ante cost of equity capital from the residual income valuation model (Ohlson 1995) . This method is algebraically equivalent to the familiar dividend discount model and has been used by Botosan (1997) and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001, GLS hereafter) , among others.
We follow the methodology employed by GLS. 10 Specifically, the implied cost of equity capital, R, is the internal rate of return that equates the current stock price to the intrinsic value of the stock, i.e., the sum of the current book value of equity and the discounted future abnormal earnings:
10 Botosan and Plumlee (2002) use the dividend discount model to estimate the cost of equity capital. This approach is not used here because the dividend model requires an estimation of stock prices in the future, which is not readily available in Asia. In addition, Botosan and Plumlee (2001) show that the costs of capital measures estimated from the residual income model are highly correlated with those estimated from a dividend discount model.
where P t is the stock price at time t, B t is the book value of equity at time t, R is the ex ante cost of equity capital, ROE t+i is the return on equity in period t+i, and ) (⋅ t represents the expectation based on information available at time t. Because equation (5) 
where FROE is the forecasted return on equity. For the first three years, FROE t+i = FEPS t+i /B t+i-1 , where FEPS t+i is the I/B/E/S median forecasted EPS for year t+i.
11
We obtain the FROE series from the 4 th year by linearly interpolating FROE t+3 to an "equilibrium" ROE by the T th year. The "equilibrium" ROE is proxied by the median ROE of the industry of the country in which the firm is located over the previous five years.
12
B t in equation (6) is defined as the book value of equity from the most recent financial statement available. We assume that the book value of equity, earnings, and dividends satisfy the "clean surplus relationship" in expectation, i.e., , where pout t+i is the forecasted dividend payout ratio, measured by the median payout ratio over the previous five years. 13 We estimate each firm's cost of equity capital at the end of June of each year. 14 Once the FROE t+i and B t+ i series are constructed, R can be solved from equation (6) for a 11 If the EPS forecasts for year t+2 or t+3 are missing, we construct our own forecast by interpolating or extrapolating the I/B/E/S forecasts made for the adjacent two years. Specifically, if the EPS forecast for year t+3 is missing, we assume that EPS t+3 =2EPS t+2 -EPS t+1 ; if the EPS forecast for year t+2 is missing, we assume that EPS t+2 =(EPS t+3 +EPS t+1 )/2; and if neither of the EPS forecasts for year t+2 and year t+3 are available, we assume that EPS t+3 =EPS t+2 =EPS t+1 . 12 To compute the industry median ROE, we group firms into 10 industries according to the Datastream global uniform level 3 industry definition. In addition, similar to GLS, we exclude loss-making firms in calculating the industry ROE because the population of profitable firms better reflects the long-term industry equilibrium ROE. 13 To avoid the bias caused by extreme payout patterns, we eliminate payout ratios greater than 1 or less than 0. In addition, pout t+i is set to zero if FROE t+i is negative. 14 We also tried using earnings forecast and market value data in other months. These estimates of the cost of equity capital are highly correlated with each other. In addition, our conclusions are robust to the time at which the cost of equity capital is estimated.
given value of T.
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Since the appropriate number for T is not certain, we estimate the cost of equity capital using different assumptions of T ranging from 4 to 12. These estimates of R are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, in the following analysis we use the estimate assuming T=6, and examine the sensitivity of the results to the assumption of T values in Section 6.2.
16 Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of the estimates of the cost of equity capital and risk-related firm characteristics. Panel A shows the results of the pooled sample and Panel B those by economy. For the full sample, the mean (median) cost of equity capital is 9.86% (7.81%).
17
The standard deviation is 7.96% and the inter-quartile range is 6.65%. We also observe that 90% of the observations are concentrated in the range between 2.35% and 24.73%, indicating that the distribution of the estimated cost of capital is relatively tight.
[Insert Table 4 here] 15 The solution is derived using a numerical approximation with the Quasi-Newton approach. Botosan and Plumlee (2001) argue that the objective of the cost of capital estimation is not to obtain the exact value of the cost of capital, but to capture the cross-sectional variation of the cost of capital. Thus, if the process does not converge to a solution, we constrain our final estimate to the interval of [0, 0.6] . 16 It is possible that analysts could fail to anticipate the expropriation by majority shareholders in poorly governed firms, thus creating a positive correlation between forecast errors and the level of corporate governance. But this won't lead to a bias in our estimates of the cost of equity capital as long as the forecasts provide by the I/B/E/S are unbiased estimates of the market's expectations of future earnings. 17 Compared with the U.S. studies, our estimates of the cost of equity capital seem to be low; but they are still reasonable. GLS (2001) report an average market risk premium of 2% to 3% over 1979 to 1995 using U.S. data. The market premium in Asian emerging markets is supposed to be on average 1% to 2% higher than that in the U.S. Consider a 5% average of the risk-free interest rate. Our cost of capital estimate produces an average premium of about 3% to 5%. Note that most firms in the sample are large firms that should have lower discount rates. Therefore the market premium should be higher than the above number. One possible reason for our low estimates of the cost of equity capital is that we include the period of the Asian financial crisis (1997) (1998) in calculating the industry median ROE, when the accounting performance of firms in the Asian markets was very low. However, there is no reason to believe that the low level of industry ROE will bias the estimates of the cost of equity capital between firms with strong and weak corporate governance.
The validity of the cost of equity capital estimates
The CAPM suggests that a valid measure of the cost of equity capital should increase with the systematic risk measured by the market beta. We also expect it to be negatively correlated with firm size and positively correlated with the book-to-market ratio (Fama and French 1992) . Thus, we regress our cost of equity capital estimates against the market beta, firm size, and the book-to-market ratio.
18
Since our sample includes firm-year observations across nine economies over two years, we use within-economy and within-year fractional ranks of all variables in the regressions to neutralize the difference in country risk premium and the change over time. A fractional rank is defined as the rank of a given variable divided by the number of observations having non-missing values for the ranking variable. The results are reported in Table 5 .
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[Insert Table 5 here]
In Table 5 , as expected, the cost of equity capital increases with the market beta and the book-to-market ratio and decreases with firm size. The adjusted R 2 of the regression that includes beta and firm size is 11.89%. This is comparable to the adjusted R 2 of 13.7% in the regression that includes beta and firm size variables reported by Botosan (1997) . It is not surprising that the inclusion of the book-to-market ratio significantly increases the explanatory power to over 50% since the cost of equity capital is derived from the market-to-book ratio.
20 18 We do not examine the association of our measure of the cost of equity capital with all the firm characteristics documented by GLS (2001) that correlated with their cost of equity capital estimates, because our purpose is to investigate the relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosure and other corporate governance mechanisms, a purpose clearly different from theirs. 19 To adjust for the bias created by heteroskedasticity, the White-adjusted t-statistics are reported in Table 5 . In addition, the results using raw data are qualitatively similar. 20 If both sides of equation (6) are divided by B t , R becomes a determinant of the market-to-book ratio.
Empirical Analysis
Univariate analysis
In this section we investigate the empirical relationships between the cost of equity capital, disclosure, and other corporate governance attributes. Table 6 presents the Spearman correlations between the cost of equity capital, beta, firm size, book-to-market, and disclosure as well as corporate governance scores from the CLSA survey. Consistent with our expectations, Table 6 shows a significant negative correlation between the cost of equity capital and transparency (TRAN) as well as between the cost of equity capital and the composite non-disclosure governance score (NDCG). In addition, all individual non-disclosure governance attributes have a significantly negative correlation with the cost of equity capital.
[Insert Table 6 here]
We also find that disclosure and corporate governance are correlated with the factors affecting a firm's risk. Non-disclosure governance (NDCG) is negatively correlated with Beta (with a correlation coefficient of -0.28). In addition, larger firms tend to adopt more forthright disclosure policies: the correlation between firm size and TRAN is 0.08 and is significant at the 5% level. Larger firms also tend to adopt better non-disclosure governance, e.g., firm size is positively correlated with DSPL, INDP, ACCT, and NDCG. Consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Claessen et al. 2002; La Porta et al. 2002; Durnev and Kim 2003) , corporate governance has a significant negative correlation with book-to-market ratios.
Given the significant correlations between risk-relevant firm characteristics and disclosure as well as corporate governance, the inference drawn from simple correlations may be misleading. In the next sections, we investigate the marginal effect of disclosure and other corporate governance mechanisms by including control variables in the multivariate regressions.
Effects of firm-level disclosure and corporate governance
The effects of disclosure and other corporate governance mechanisms at firm level on the cost of equity capital are tested by regressing the estimated cost of equity capital on disclosure and non-disclosure corporate governance attributes, controlling for market beta and firm size.
That is:
To adjust for the potential non-comparability of the dependent and independent variables across economies, we use within-economy and within-year fractional ranks for both the dependent and independent variables in the regressions. Firms with higher corporate governance or disclosure quality receive higher rankings in the variables. The White-adjusted t-statistics are used for inferences. The results of three regressions based on equation (7) are reported in Table 7 . The first regression includes only the Disclosure variable (TRAN) and the last two regressions include both Disclosure and Governance variable(s) as treatment variables.
The result of the first regression indicates that, in emerging markets, disclosure can reduce the cost of equity capital. The coefficient of transparency scores in the first regression is -0.12, which is significant at the 1% level. Our second hypothesis is supported by the second and third regressions. The coefficient of the composite measure of non-disclosure corporate governance (NDCG) is -0.19, which is significant at the 1% level. In addition, the coefficients of three of the five non-disclosure governance attributes (DSPL, RESP, and FAIR) are negative and significant at the 10% level or better, when they are included in the same regression. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of the five non-disclosure governance attributes are jointly zero is rejected at the 1% level (χ 2 =35.43).
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[Insert Table 7 here]
These findings suggest that investors pay a premium for firms with good corporate governance. Specifically, the coefficient of -0.19 of NDCG in the second regression in Table 7 implies that when a firm improves its non-disclosure corporate governance ranking from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, its cost of equity capital can be reduced by approximately 1.26 percentage points [i.e., 0.19 times the range of the cost of capital between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile in Panel A of Table 4 (11.60% -4.95%)] after controlling for beta and size.
The 1.26-point reduction in the cost of capital is equivalent to an increase of more than 20% in firm value with some reasonable assumptions.
22
In summary, investors value better corporate governance by discounting the expected cash flows with a lower rate. Companies with weak corporate governance have the potential to enhance shareholder value by strengthening it. On the other hand, companies that fail to improve their governance mechanisms will have to bear a higher cost when they try to obtain external capital to finance their growth.
Effects of country-level legal protection
The results in the above section show the effects of firm-level disclosure and other 21 All five variables are significant when they are included in equation (8) individually with TRAN. 22 This is true when a constant growth model, with the spread between the cost of capital and the growth rate less than 6%, is assumed for the firm at top 25th percentile corporate governance ranking. To show the argument, denote V 1 (R 1 ) and V 2 (R 2 ) as the value (the cost of capital) for the good and the bad corporate governance firms, respectively. Assume that both companies have the same constant growth rate of g. From the relation of (8) In equation (8) LEGAL is measured as the aggregation of (i) the government corruption index, (ii) the index of the risk of expropriation of private property by the government, and (iii) the index of the risk of the government repudiating contracts, in La Porta et al. (1998b) (see Morck et al. 2000) . Since equation (8) Table 8 .
[Insert Table 8 here] Consistent with the studies investigating firm value and country-level corporate governance, the coefficient of LEGAL is significantly negative in both regressions, indicating that investors pay a premium for the country-level legal protection of private property rights.
The firm-level corporate governance is also important in reducing the cost of equity capital.
The coefficient of NDCG is -0.17, which is still significant at the 1% level. In addition, two of the five non-disclosure governance attributes (DSPL and INDP) are significant when the five non-disclosure corporate governance attributes are included simultaneously, and the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the five attributes are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 1% level (χ 2 =32.15). In contrast, the coefficient of transparency declines to around -0.05, and is not significant in both regressions, indicating that the country-level legal protection and the firm-level corporate governance have greater effects on the cost of equity capital than does disclosure.
Comparison of the effects of disclosure and corporate governance on the cost of equity capital
Both Tables 7 and 8 show that in Asia's emerging markets, although disclosure has a negative effect on the cost of equity capital, the magnitude of the effect is less than that of the non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, the second regression in Table   7 shows that the cost of equity capital's association with TRAN is weaker (slope coefficient = -0.07) compared with the association with NDCG (slope coefficient = -0.19). The significance level of TRAN also weakens from the level of 0.01 to only 0.10 when NDCG is included in the regression model. In comparison to the reduction of 1.26 percentage points in the cost of equity capital when a firm improves the non-disclosure corporate governance ranking from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, the corresponding reduction from the same improvement in transparency is only 0.47 point.
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Moreover, in the two regressions in Table 8 , TRAN becomes insignificant when both the LEGAL and non-disclosure corporate governance variables are included.
We conjecture that the relatively weaker role of disclosure is related to the corporate governance environments in Asia's emerging markets. Bushman and Smith (2001) point out three channels by which financial accounting information can reduce the external financing costs, namely, identifying good versus bad project, reducing information asymmetry, and disciplining corporate insiders. A closer examination of how the last two channels function in Asia suggests a weaker role of disclosure of accounting and other information. The reasons are that the effectiveness of disclosure in reducing information asymmetry depends on the quality of the information disclosed and the extent to which investors rely on corporate disclosure, and the effectiveness of disclosure in disciplining corporate insiders depends on external corporate governance mechanisms. As explained below, both information quality and external governance mechanisms are too poor or too weak for disclosure to play an effective role in Asia's emerging markets.
As discussed in Section 2.1, because of less effective enforcement and highly concentrated ownership in Asia's emerging markets, the accounting information is of lower quality and credibility. Besides, investors might pay less attention to firm-specific information because poor legal protection of private property rights discourages them from capitalizing firm-specific information. Both make disclosure less effective in reducing the estimation risk and information asymmetry.
The corporate governance function of disclosure is also relatively weak in Asia's emerging markets. The strength of this function relies on external governance mechanisms such as shareholder litigation (Kellogg 1984; Francis et al. 1994; Skinner 1994 and and corporate control markets (Palepu 1986 ). Without them, investors cannot take action to protect themselves even if they detect any irregularities in managerial actions from corporate disclosure.
These mechanisms typically do not function properly in emerging markets like Asia's (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . Thus, investors have to rely on internal corporate governance mechanisms to protect themselves from being expropriated by corporate insiders. This suggests that disclosure is less helpful in monitoring corporate insiders in Asia's emerging markets. As a result, disclosure is less effective than internal corporate governance mechanisms in reducing the cost of equity capital in emerging markets.
Sensitivity Tests
Results by year and by economy
We perform further tests to determine whether or not the effect of governance on the cost of capital clusters in time or economies. Table 9 presents the year-by-year and economy-by-economy results of regression (7) separately. The coefficient of NDCG is significantly negative in both 2000 and 2001. However, the coefficient of TRAN is not significant in either year. Table 9 also shows that the coefficients of NDCG are significantly negative in seven out of the nine economies in our sample. Interestingly, among them, the economies most affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, namely Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, with the exception of Korea, have the most significant effect in reducing the cost of capital by improving corporate governance. More specifically, Thailand has the highest negative coefficient (-0.68) of NDCG, followed by the Philippines (-0.51) and Indonesia (-0.41). These coefficients roughly translate into a corresponding reduction in the cost of equity capital by 4.97%, 3.00%, and 2.44%, respectively, if a firm improves its non-disclosure corporate governance ranking within their economy from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile. In contrast, the coefficient of TRAN is significantly negative only in the Indian sample. The conclusion to be drawn from the year-by-year and economy-by-economy results suggests that the effects of disclosure and non-disclosure governance mechanisms are not concentrated in any given year or economy.
[Insert Table 9 here]
Effects of book-to-market and reversal time in estimating the cost of equity capital
Prior studies (La Porta et al. 2002; Claessens et al. 2002) find that legal protection and expropriation risk affect Tobin's Q, which is highly correlated with book-to-market ratios. In addition, GLS (2001) and our results in Section 4.2 also indicate that the book-to-market ratio is positively correlated with the estimate of the cost of equity capital. It is likely that the negative correlation between corporate governance and the cost of equity capital is induced by the book-to-market ratio.
To address this issue, we include the book-to-market ratio in the regressions of the cost of equity capital against disclosure and non-disclosure governance mechanisms. The results (not reported) show that the conclusions in Section 5.3 are not qualitatively affected. That is, the coefficient of NDCG is still significantly negative, but at a lower level, and the coefficient of TRAN is not significant.
In estimating the cost of equity capital, we assume that the ROE declines to the industry level by the end of the 6 th year (T=6). To test whether our results are sensitive to the assumption of T, we recalculate the cost of equity capital assuming T=4 to T=12 and use each estimate as the dependent variable in regression (7). The results (not reported here) in these regressions are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 7 . Specifically, the coefficient of NDCG is significantly negative, while the coefficient of TRAN is either insignificant or marginally significant.
Conclusions
We examine the effects of disclosure and other corporate governance mechanisms on the cost of equity capital using two newly released surveys by CLSA on the quality of disclosure and corporate governance. The sample covers 545 firm-year observations across nine Asia's emerging markets in 2000 and 2001. The regression results show that a higher score on disclosure and a higher score on non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms are associated with a lower cost of equity capital, after controlling for factors such as beta and firm size.
Furthermore, we find that country-level legal protection of private property rights and firm-level corporate governance are both important in reducing the cost of equity capital. The findings highlight an important link between corporate governance at both the firm level and the country level and the cost of capital. We also find that the negative association between disclosure and the cost of equity capital is weaker when non-disclosure governance mechanisms are included in the regressions. Our results are robust to the inclusion of book-to-market ratios and to the duration in reverting the ROE to the industry mean in estimating the cost of equity capital.
Our study contributes to the literature on disclosure. We find that the negative correlation between disclosure and the cost of equity capital documented in the U.S. (Botosan, 1997; Botoan and Plumlee 2002) can be extended to emerging markets. However, in emerging markets, the negative relation between disclosure and the cost of equity capital is weaker after controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our result suggests that, in emerging markets where the infrastructure factors, such as the legal protection of investors, are lacking, the role of disclosure in reducing the cost of equity capital is not as important as other non-disclosure corporate governance mechanisms. Hence, reducing the expropriation risk by strengthening the overall corporate governance mechanisms appears to be more important than adopting a more forthright disclosure policy to reduce the cost of equity capital.
Our study also contributes to the corporate governance literature. This paper suggests that the risk of being expropriated by insiders is not diversifiable. Thus, investors not only expect lower future cash flows for weak governance firms, as documented in prior research (La Porta et al. 2002) , they also discount the expected future cash flows at a higher rate. This finding is important, since a firm's cost of capital is a more direct measure of financing cost than firm valuation. Based on our rough estimation, if a firm improves its corporate governance ranking from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile within its economy, its cost of capital equity can be reduced by 1.26 percentage points. This is equivalent to an improvement of firm value by more than 20% given some reasonable assumptions. The benefit from the improvement in corporate governance is even more profound for economies that were affected the most during the Asian financial crisis, namely Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, with the exception of Korea. Thus, this research provides more evidence in support of strengthening corporate governance in Asia's emerging markets. 
TABLE 4 Descriptive Statistics for the Cost of Equity Capital Estimates and Risk-Related Firm Characteristics
Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the cost of equity capital and the risk-related firm characteristics for the pooled sample. R is the estimated cost of equity capital in percent, which is estimated by adopting the GLS (2001) approach and assuming that a firm's ROE declines to the industry level by the next 6 th year. Beta is the market beta estimated by Datastream, MV is the market capitalization in billions of U.S. dollars, and B/M is the ratio of book equity to market capitalization Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the cost of equity capital estimates by economy. 
TABLE 5 The OLS Regressions of the Cost of Equity Capital on the Measures of Firm Risk
This table provides the results of the OLS regression of the cost of equity capital on beta, firm size, and book-to-market equity. Cost of equity capital is estimated by adopting GLS (2001) and assuming a firm's ROE declines to the industry median by the 6 th year. Beta i,t is the most current market beta from Datastream. MV i,t is the market value of equity (in millions of U.S. dollars) measured at the end of June of year t, B/M i,t is the book-to-market ratio measured at the end of the previous calendar year. All variables are converted into within-economy/year fractional ranks. The sample covers 545 firm-year observations. The White-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
TABLE 6 Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients among Research Variables
The table provides the Spearman correlation coefficients betwen the research variables. R is the cost of equity capital estimated by adopting the GLS (2001) approach and assuming that a firm's ROE will decline to the industry median by the 6 th year. Beta is the market beta estimated by Datastream, MV is the market value of equity measured (in millions of U.S. dollars) at the end of June, and B/M is the the book-to-market equity measured at the end of the previous calendar year. TRAN, DSPL, INDP, ACCT, RESP, and FAIR are the scores for transparency, discipline, independence, accountability, responsibility, and fairness in the CLSA survey. NDCG is the sum of all above scores except for TRAN. All variables are converted into the within economy/year fractional ranks. The sample covers 545 firm-year observations across nine Asian emerging markets in 2000 and 2001. In parentheses are the p-values for which the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is zero is rejected. 
